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Abstract 
This thesis tests Franklin & Weber's finding that national elections have a temporal 
proximity-effect. They find that when a  first-order election is closer in time, voters in second-
order elections behave more similar to voters in a first-order election. By investigating 
respondent behaviour in polls - which, for voters, are similar to second-order elections - this 
thesis tests Franklin and Weber's novel findings. By using Swedish poll-results over a long 
time the thesis investigates whether a shorter temporal distance to a national election make 
respondents more likely to respond to the polls with instrumental rather than sincere 
concerns.  
The thesis finds that vote sincerity (the tendency to vote for ones favourite party) is larger in 
the beginning and middle of an electoral cycle, and that that it drops closer to the next 
election. Contrary to Franklin & Weber's findings this temporal proximity-effect is only found 
in the time leading up to the election, but after the election it seems to disappear.  
Besides testing Franklin & Weber's findings on voter behaviour, the thesis also shines some 
light on respondent behaviour in polls. It shows that temporal proximity is an important 
factor that determines how respondents answers in opinion-polls, implying  that polls far from 
an election will be systematically worse at predicting election results.   
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1.1. Franklin & Weber and the polls 
Polls are problematic. Looking back at the Swedish electoral cycle 2006-2010 it was only 
during the four months around that the poll-of-polls managed to mirror the election-results 
fairly well.
1
 This may seem a harmless case of respondents changing their opinions during the 
electoral cycle, but the thesis show that it is partly something much more problematic: the 
amount of time until the next election systematically changes some of the respondents 
priorities and considerations when answering in the poll. 
Very recently Mark Franklin and Till Weber wrote a working paper (soon to be published) in 
which they discovered that national elections had a gravity-like effect (temporal proximity-
effect) on European Parliament-elections (EP-elections). In EP-elections closer to a national 
election, voters give more weight to considerations similar to those in the national election. In 
EP-elections further from a national elections, voters are more likely to give weight to other 
concerns. For example people are more likely to vote according to party-preference, rather 
than instrumental concerns when the election is far away.
2
  
First-order elections bring additional considerations to bear, considerations that 
are sufficient salient to voters as to override even rational considerations of lower 
salience
3
 
Franklin & Weber's research relates to a lot of previous research on so-called "Second-order 
elections" (elections where national executive power is not at stake). EP-elections are often 
considered second-order elections and differ from national elections because voters think of 
them as less important. Voters use second-order election to send signals about their opinions 
in national elections. EP-elections and other second-order elections are also preceded by less 
campaigning than first-order elections (national elections).4 Much conceptualization about 
second-order elections, including Franklin & Weber's own research imply that in second-
order elections voters are more willing to vote for their favourite parties or the parties they 
think are best at policy-making in the area. This is similar to the measurable concept of 
"Sincere voting" (to vote for the party that is ones favourite).  
                                                          
1
 Holmberg & Oscarsson 2013 p. 28 
2
 Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013) p. 25 
3
 Op. Cit. p. 26 
4
 Op. Cit. p.2 
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This thesis tests Franklin & Weber's finding that national elections have a temporal 
proximity-effect by investigating a situation which should be sensitive to the instrumental 
concerns raised by a national election in the same way as second-order elections: polls. Using 
a comparison of vote intention and party preference on Swedish poll-results over a long time 
allows the thesis to investigates whether a shorter temporal distance to a national election 
make respondents more likely to respond to the polls with instrumental rather than sincere 
concerns.  
The thesis finds that vote sincerity is larger in the beginning and middle of an electoral cycle, 
and that that it drops closer to the next election. Contrary to Franklin & Weber's findings this 
temporal distance-effect is only found in the time leading up to the election, but after the 
election it seems to disappear. In this testing the thesis manages to do three things: first it 
shows that the mechanisms that make second-order elections special are transferable to polls; 
second it questions some of Franklin & Weber's interpretations and thirdly it contributes to 
the understanding of why poll results far from elections tend to be poor reflections of the 
results in the actual election.
5
 This final contribution is actually very important: the cyclical 
temporal proximity-effect on polls which the thesis discovers help interpret what poll-results 
actually mean. 
Figure 1. The research problem 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Holmberg & Oscarsson (2013) p. 28; Martinsson (2009), p. 262 
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2.1. Franklin & Weber's temporal proximity-effect 
A recent study delved into the problem of temporal proximity to first-order elections. Franklin 
& Weber investigated how first-order elections tend to have structuring effects on the second-
order elections close to them, by studying European-Parliament elections within different 
temporal proximities to national elections.
6
 Their study is continues on previous research they 
reported in 2010 concerned with how party systems are consolidated, but their approach 
brings them close to the scope of this thesis.
7
 Closer to a national election, the considerations 
that voters make in a corresponding EP-election are more similar to those in the national 
election. And when further from a national election, voters are more likely to give weight to 
other concerns. For example when the election is far away people are more likely to vote 
according to issue opinion (and with their hearts), rather than instrumental concerns.
8
 
Essentially the causal mechanisms Franklin & Weber point out are that second-order elections 
can "borrow" voting behaviour from first-order elections. The ideas, preconception and 
priorities which voters developed for the first-order election, including their tactical voting-
strategies, party-leader preferences and opinions on government competence are allowed to 
colour their votes in the second-order election, if it is close in time to the first-order election. 
When the first-order election is further away many of these borrowed instrumental concerns 
fade in favour of, for example, voting for favourites or parties one considers most competent 
on issues relevant in the second-order election. 
The effects of this variable [...]  indicate that respondents’ preferences move 
towards a party they consider most competent on issues as the cycle moves towards 
midterm.
9
  
Franklin & Weber claims that this tendency can be interpreted as voters voting "with their 
hearts" (which is a popular theory about second-order elections), but that they think an 
alternative explanation is better. Their preferred explanation is that voters behave more like 
Downsean rational voters (voting for the party that they think is best in EU-issues) during 
midterm than when the first-order election is close. This is because first-order elections are 
salient enough to override the less salient concerns of the second-order election.
10
  
                                                          
6
 Franklin & Weber (Working paper 2013) p. 2  
7
 Franklin & Weber (2010) 
8
 Franklin & Weber (Working paper 2013) p. 25 
9
 Op. Cit. p. 21f 
10
 Op. Cit p. 25f 
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According to Franklin & Weber proximity to a first-order election does have effect. Since 
polls share many features of second-order elections, this temporal proximity-effect should 
exist for polls as well. Thus polls can be used to test the temporal proximity-effect Franklin & 
Weber discovered. Generally, regular polls do not contain the huge amounts of data which 
Franklin & Weber use map out how first-order elections structure second-order elections. 
However there are regular polls in Sweden which makes it possible to test the proposition that 
there is a temporal proximity-effect for people "voting with their hearts" or with sincerity: are 
people more sincere in mid-term polls than in polls close to a national election?  
It is important to notice that Franklin & Weber do not exclude the possibility that people do 
vote with their hearts, but rather interpret the data indicating such a voting-behaviour as a part 
of the Downsean rationality they use to explain the temporal proximity-effect. 
2.2. Sincere voting 
"Sincere voting" essentially is to vote for the party one likes the best, the favourite party.
11
 
Sincere voting is contrasted with insincere (Rosema uses the term non-sincere) voting, where 
people vote for other parties than their favourites, for example due to tactical reasons, 
performance evaluations, candidate evaluations, habit and to support the largest party in 
coalition with their favourite party.
12
  
A number of items has been shown to impact whether people vote sincerely or insincerely. 
The voters preferred coalition after the election has a lot of impact - and made many voters 
vote for another party than their favourite.
13
 Furthermore, there are indications that some 
voters prefer to vote for the strongest party that is in a potential coalition with their favourite 
party.
14
  
There is always a discrepancy between party-preference and voting intention, the size of this 
discrepancy depends on how many voters whom let insincere concerns crowd out the sincere 
concerns of party-preference.
15
  
 
 
                                                          
11
 Rosema (2004) p. 63 
12
 Op. Cit. p. 137ff 
13
 Rosema (2006) p. 483f 
14
 Holmberg & Oscarsson (2013) p. 175 
15
 Rosema (2004) p. 65, Rosema (2006) p. 482f 
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Table 1. Vote insincerity in Swedish elections 
Election 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Insincere 4.4 16.2 8.8 4.6 5.4 6 14.3 
Source data in appendix D 
As shown using data over Swedish elections, the degree of insincere voting has varied a lot 
over the last six Swedish elections. Sometimes it's effect has been very substantial, sufficient 
to cause election results different from those that would have emerged, had everyone voted 
for their favourites. 
This thesis expects that when there are less insincere concerns salient, more respondents will 
vote sincerely, when there are more insincere concerns salient, respondents more respondents 
will vote insincerely. For example: a poll farther away from an election should inherit less of 
the elections insincere concerns and thus display more vote sincerity. This mirrors the theories 
regarding second order election: when the government issue is removed more people are free 
to vote with their hearts, or their issue-opinions. 
2.3. Second-order elections similarities to polls 
Second-order elections are elections where  national executive power is not at stake. In 
second-order elections it is not uncommon that voters use their votes to send signals to the 
politicians whom they may vote for in an upcoming first-order election.
16
 Second-order 
elections do share important features with polls. Voters rarely consider second-order elections 
as important as first-order elections, since they have less impact on the national politics of 
which many voters are most interested, Rief and Schmitt conceptualize this as the "Less-at-
stake"-dimension.
17
 Polls go a bit further, since they elect no-one, not even to a second-order 
office. Furthermore, second-order elections are preceded by less campaigning than first-order 
elections.
18
 The same thing is very true for polls (unless they happen close to the election), 
people are asked to respond during a time when they have not been bombarded with political 
information. This should be seen in the light of John Zaller's theories of mass opinion: 
campaigns and intensive information-flows are important for a certain parts of the electorate 
when they develop their vote-intention. Campaigns have the potential to sway the opinions, 
                                                          
16
 Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013)  p.2 
17
 Norris (1997) p. 111; Rief & Schmitt p.9; Holmberg & Oscarsson (2010) p. 20 
18
 Hix & Marsh (2007) p.496 
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especially among those who have less political knowledge.
19
 The similarity between polls and 
second-order elections are such that the causal mechanisms behind the temporal proximity-
effect should exist for polls as well. An approaching national election should make 
instrumental concerns, such as tactical voting, government competence etc. relevant for the 
respondents in a poll the same way they become relevant for a voter in a second-order 
election. 
2.4. Findings on second-order elections  
Compared to the literature on polls, the literature on second-order elections is extensive. In 
both American midterms and EP-elections (which are often considered second-order elections 
compared to the first-order national elections) the government tend to lose out to the 
opposition. In EP-elections this mainly benefits small parties in opposition.
20
  
There are four theories with extra prominence in the literature that explain these tendencies 
and the differences between first- and second-order elections. The first theory states that since 
voters do not think that second-order elections are as important as first-order elections, the 
voters do not feel the need to make as many tactical choices, and instead are free to vote more 
"with their hearts". Thus votes in second-order elections are supposed to reflect the voters 
sincere opinions better than their votes in first-order elections.
21
   
A second theory states that voters are less concerned with the outcome of the election and 
thus use the election to signal satisfaction or (more likely) dissatisfaction with the current 
government.
22
 A third states that what actually happens is that first-order elections are so 
campaign-heavy that they manage to distort voters "normal" opinions. However, during 
second-order elections there is less electoral communication, and thus the voters change less 
and remain closer to said "normal" opinions.
 23
 This theory is similar to the idea of "Surge and 
decline", where the winner of a first-order election has mobilized more voters than what is 
normal (surge) and in the second-order election there is less mobilization (decline), so that the 
winner of the first-order election appears to be losing support.
24
  
                                                          
19
 Zaller (1992) p. 267 
20
 Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013)   p. 11ff; Tufte (1975) p. 812; Hix & Marsh (2007) p. 506 
21
 Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013)  p. 14 
22
 Norris (1997) p. 112; Hix & Marsh (2007) p. 495 
23
 Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013)  p. 1 
24
 Campbell (1987) p. 977 
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The fourth and final theory is quite obvious: the second-order election is not about the same 
thing as the first-order election. In a EP-election or an American midterm there are new 
candidates and different issues. In this theory, the second-order election is not really a second-
order election, some voters do treat it like a different first order-election.  
Franklin & Weber's findings seems to support either a theory close to our third, surge-and-
decline-like theory or a theory like the first - where it is voters sincere opinions that matter. 
Franklin & Weber's interpretation are along the lines of the third theory: national elections 
mobilize a surge of special concerns, such as tactical and instrumental voting-concerns, and 
further from the election, these concerns decline in favour of issue-voting which they appear 
to think can be mistaken for "voting with ones heart", but believe signals a different 
behaviour. Second-order election theory still claims that "voting with ones heart" is a very 
important feature of the elections. This thesis does not consider the different explanations 
mutually exclusive, sincere voting (or voting "with ones heart) seems to be one of the things 
which are crowded out by the upcoming national election. 
2.5 The problem with believing the polls 
Studies on respondent behaviour in polls are rare, which causes a problematic knowledge-gap. 
In Sweden there are some publications looking into how reliable different polls are.
25
 There is 
plenty of research on how polls impact the behaviours of other actors in society after they are 
published. Some researchers are worried that polls turn political debate away from issues and 
towards a "horse-race" where focus is on the parties relative size, rather than their opinions.
26
 
There are also debated instances of the so called "bandwagon effect" where the success of a 
party in polls inspire people to vote for it in election and the "underdog effect" where bad 
results for a party in polls make people tactically vote to save it.
27
 
There are also indications that politicians care a lot about the results in opinion polls, 
according to Strömbäck, they may even care more than the general citizen.
28
 More than thirty 
years ago Holmberg & Petersson indicated a similar thing, most parties order polls and use 
them as part of their strategic work.
29
 Added up, past research makes it clear that a lot of 
people: voters, politicians and researchers, rely on opinion polls. Disregarding any normative 
                                                          
25
 Holmberg & Petersson (1980), Petersson (2008) 
26
 Moy & Rinke. (2012 - edt. Holtz-Bacha & Strömbäck) p. 226 
27
 Op. Cit. p. 229 
28
 Strömbäck (2012 - edt. Holtz-Bacha & Strömbäck) p. 261 
29
 Holmberg & Petersson (1980) p.211ff 
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issues on whether polls should impact political behaviour from any group, it is a problem for 
all actors who base analysis or decisions on opinion polls if said polls turns out to be 
misguiding.  
Some problems with polls are known, for example the margins of error, when too few 
respondents makes statistically significant conclusions on opinion-changes difficult. Another 
problem is the phrasing of questions to the respondents, which could impact how they answer 
and a third is the problem of non-randomness when selecting respondents.
30
 However this 
thesis adds something important and new: it investigates whether respondents in polls think 
differently, when the polls happens further from a national election. This is important since it 
adds knowledge about cyclical and stable changes in the responses in opinion polls. The 
causal mechanisms from Franklin & Weber's research help interpreting results in polls which 
would otherwise be wrongfully attributed to party behaviour or current events. 
2.6. How polls test Franklin & Weber 
This thesis tests Franklin & Weber's finding that national elections have a temporal 
proximity-effect on a situation which should share the causal mechanisms which explain the 
temporal proximity-effect in second-order elections: polls. The thesis aims to provide 
additional understanding for two phenomena. First how proximity to a first-order election 
impacts respondents or voters behaviours, second how polls may systematically deviate from 
election results. These two phenomena can be investigated in concert, since temporal 
proximity to a first-order election seems to have properties which impact how and why people 
vote in polls. By looking at the effects of temporal distance to election on polls, it is possible 
to both continue on Franklin & Weber work as well as investigating why polls far from an 
election rarely mirror it very well.  
Franklin & Weber attribute the effect they found to voter rationality, rather than to voting 
with ones heart or sincere voting. However, a lot of second-order election-theory do claim 
that sincere voting is an important feature of second order elections. Actually the two theories 
are not incompatible and the way Franklin & Weber presents their findings it seems that 
sincere voting (or "voting with ones heart") is a part of this rationality. People vote for the 
parties they think are best, which is compatible with sincere voting, however they do not vote 
"on a whim" or without thinking.  
                                                          
30
 Holmberg & Petersson (1980) p. 43; 65 
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2.7. Research questions and hypothesis  
Two research questions and the hypothesises associated to them will guide the study in this 
thesis. The first question is: Is vote sincerity in polls affected by temporal proximity to the 
national election? Looking at vote sincerity related to the temporal proximity to election there 
are roughly four clear possible outcomes: a) Sincerity is systematically smaller close to 
elections than around mid-cycle periods; b) sincerity is systematically larger close to election; 
c) sincerity does not systematically shift; d) sincerity is systematically smaller or larger, but 
during other points of time not specifically related to the election. Based upon the second-
order election theory used in this study, there are sound reasons to expect the sincerity to be 
smaller around elections. Thus the first hypothesis is: a) sincerity is systematically smaller 
close to elections than around mid-cycle periods. Any other of the predicted outcomes would 
result in a rejection of the hypothesis. 
A question that will help understanding the effects of shifting levels of sincerity is about 
whom benefits. Studies on EP-elections show a number some beneficiaries: a) Small parties; 
b) Non-government parties;.
31
 The benefits of opposition-parties and small parties could be 
due to the second-order features of the election, and thus they guide our second hypothesis: 
The main beneficiaries in polls with more vote sincerity will be both: a) small parties; b) 
Opposition parties. 
Table 2. First and second hypothesis-matrix 
Sincerity close to election x 
parties benefitting from 
sincere voting 
Yes - Small parties and 
opposition parties benefits 
No - Small parties and 
opposition parties do not 
benefit 
Less sincerity close to the 
election 
Hypothesises 1 and 2 
confirmed 
Hypothesis 1 confirmed, 
hypothesis 2 rejected 
Even sincerity close to the 
election 
Hypothesis 1 rejected, 
hypothesis 2 confirmed 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 rejected 
More sincerity close to the 
election 
Hypothesis 1 rejected, 
hypothesis 2 confirmed 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 rejected 
 
  
                                                          
31
 Marsh & Hix (2007) p. 506 
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3.1. Method 
3.2. Basic relationships 
The basic relationship investigated in this thesis about the effect of temporal distance to 
election on vote sincerity, and vote sincerity on poll-results. 
Figure 1. Basic relationship 
 
 
"Sincerity or insincerity of vote" is a complicated way to say "Voting for ones favourite 
party". The relationship gets a bit messier when other competing intersecting effects are 
included. The shift from retrospective to prospective concerns as well as the shifting effects of 
party leaders and the influence of voters whom decide which party to vote for very close to 
the election are all important effects which needs to be included in a complete theory of 
temporal proximity-effects on vote sincerity.
32
 Unfortunately the available data will not allow 
controls for many of these effects.  
3.3. Basic methodological choices 
In order to investigate this relationship a choice had to be made (due to time-considerations) 
between quantitative data, or more detailed interviews with respondents. While an interview-
approach would allow delving into the thinking of the respondents the problem with such an 
approach is threefold. First of all there is no such material readily available, while there are 
polls covering a long period of time. Second, there is the matter of number: in order to not 
only establish whether sincere voting changes during electoral cycles but also how it may 
impact the polls there needs to be a very large number of respondents (enough to get results to 
generalise, preferably for all parties). Third, interviews would capture what respondents 
believe they think is important, and their interpretation of their own behaviour, which does 
not always match the myriad of concerns which were important during the actual poll or vote. 
Instead of interviews this study utilizes data at the same macro-level as the phenomena 
investigated. When polling, focus tends to be on which parties will win, but a lot of polls have 
more to tell. Using the fact that several polls both measure vote-intention and party-preference 
makes it possible to measure systematic deviances of insincerity and sincerity in polls. This 
                                                          
32
 Rosema (2006) p. 483f 
Time to/from 
election 
Sincerity or 
insincerity of vote 
 
Poll/vote results 
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choice of data has impact on the validity and reliability of the thesis, which is expanded upon 
in chapter 4.2.2. 
The thesis uses Swedish data. Franklin & Weber have detected the temporal proximity-effect 
for the entire EU, but the Swedish case should be one of the most difficult countries to find 
the effect in. This is because Sweden has a very stable party-system with a clear left- and right 
class-cleavage around which parties take positions.
33
 In a country where the party-system is 
more consolidated and voters are less mobile, changes in vote-intentions should be smaller 
and the temporal proximity-effect should be harder to detect. Sweden is such a country and 
puts the theory to a hard test, but if it is confirmed the temporal proximity-effect gains great 
support. 
3.4. Design  
In order to measure the sincerity in the poll, it is actually easiest to measure the insincerity in 
the poll. So the essential measure used in this thesis will be about the portion of people who 
vote for another party than their favourite. The most straightforward way of doing this is to 
ask respondents first which party is their favourite and second which party they would vote 
for. Fortunately, this is being done. From these two questions it is possible to calculate a 
insincerity-measure, where a greater discrepancy between the two items means that a larger 
portion of respondents are voting for another party than their favourite (more insincerity). 
This kind of insincerity-measure is important in Rosema's studies on Sincere votes and a 
similar measure is used by Holmberg & Oscarsson to measure "tactical voting" (Holmberg & 
Oscarsson seems to be using insincere voting as a proxy for tactical voting).
34
 Since sincerity 
is defined as voting for one's favourite, respondents who are not captured the insincerity-
measure are defined as the sincere ones. While the insincerity-measure is good for capturing 
sincere and insincere voting it has a problem: the measure cannot differentiate between 
different types of sincerity or different types of insincerity.  
3.5. Details on the insincerity-measure 
The insincerity-measure is calculated by subtracting the percentages intending to vote for a 
party from the percentage that has this party as its favourite. This results in a "Single Party 
Discrepancy". The "Single Party Discrepancies" are summarized into an over-all discrepancy 
                                                          
33
 Holmberg & Oscarsson (2013) p. 74 
34
 Op. Cit. p. 175 
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for every single poll.  
An alternative, similar approach, inspired by Holmberg & Oscarsson measure of tactical 
voting, was  considered, but rejected from this thesis. The alternative was to measure how 
large a portion of the people intending to vote for a party would actually have preferred to 
vote for another. A drawback of this second approach was that it requires micro-data about 
each individual respondents voting-intention and party-preference. The first approach (which 
this study utilizes) allows comparisons between different data-sources and sources whom do 
not publish micro-data, and was therefore preferred in this thesis. 
3.6. Who benefits? 
As stated in section 2.7. a lot of literature on second-order elections indicates that certain 
types of parties tend to benefit in these elections compared to first-order elections. This thesis 
attempts to extend these parts of second-order-theories to polls as well, by examining which 
parties tend to benefit from sincere- and insincere voting. Provided that there is a 
systematically shifting lever of sincerity during the electoral cycles and provided that the 
tendency for small parties and opposition parties to benefit from second-order elections is due 
to the vote-sincerity aspect. How much said parties benefit should change in correlation with 
the insincerity-measure, so that when insincerity is low, small parties and opposition parties 
should benefit more. 
  
17 
 
4.1. Material 
The ideal data for this study would ask and report separate "party-preference" and "vote-
intention" questions. Furthermore, the more surveys per year the better. The closest to this 
ideal data in Sweden is the micro-data from the "Partisympatiundersökningen" (PSU) 
(collected by the Swedish statistical central bureau, SCB). Unfortunately it is not available, 
and parts of the micro-data is not kept. 
The second-best data that could be accessed and will be used here is the aggregated results 
from the PSU, over the time period 1973-2010 (excluding measurements from autumn 1979 
until spring 1985). It covers 9 electoral cycles, with two surveys each year (during May and 
November) The respondents are divided in three groups, each group participating during three 
polls, during each new poll one group is phased out and a new, randomly selected group is 
included. The respondents are randomly selected using the population register, which ensures 
great random selection.
35
  
Additionally, data from two poll-institutes, SIFO and SKOP, will be used. They cover the 
time-period of 2002 to 2010.  
4.1.2 Advantages with the PSU 
The main advantage with the PSU-data is its size. With 9000 respondents the typical 
drawback of many polls (that the statistical significance of changes can not be confirmed) is 
avoided or greatly reduced. Another advantage is the that the survey asks both the question of 
party-preference and vote-intention to the same people at the same time. Most other polls are 
flawed in this regard, since they either ask about party-preference or vote-intention, not both. 
Since different polls are rarely conducted at exactly the same time it is hard to compare them: 
the differences between party-preference and vote-intentions are often rather small, normal 
fluctuations in the public opinion may be enough to drown out the effect studied. Finally, the 
PSU-surveys are very transparent, the math used to treat their micro-data as well as the exact 
phrasings of the different questions in the survey are recorded (something many other polls 
are rather secretive about), this also makes it possible to ensure that the PSU-data has been 
collected in roughly the same way during the entire period of time covered in this thesis. 
Added up, this makes the PSU-data ideal for this study. 
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4.1.3. Drawbacks with the PSU 
Compared to the ideal data, the aggregated PSU-data still has some drawbacks which limit the 
scope of this thesis. The first major drawback with the PSU is that SCB only gives access to 
already treated data. The treatment of the data causes a few problems: a) while the party-
preference item is un-weighted, the vote-intention data is not, it is both weighted for people 
unwilling to respond and "filled out" with the party-preference question (so there is a overlap 
between the two measures, that could make gap between party-preference and vote-intention 
smaller). This has two implications: first the absolute levels of discrepancy may not properly 
reflect the discrepancy between the respondents answers (this problem is easily dealt with 
since the same weighting is used for the entire time series, thus it is possible to trace changes 
in discrepancy-levels, but it makes it difficult to conclude exact effect sizes). The second 
implication is that if respondents become more sure about their vote-intention, then less "fill-
out" from the party-preference is needed (which could cause a false increase in the 
discrepancy). This second implication could cause problems if respondents got more  sure of 
whom to vote for closer to the election, Table 3 shows that this problem does not occur.  
Table 3. Average portion of uncertain respondents in polls 
 May 2002-2006 November 2002-2006 
Average until election year 12.725 12.76364 
Election year 15.65 11.7 
 May 2006-2010 November 2006-2010 
Average until election year 12.5 13.04118 
Election year 14.1 9.25 
Data collected by Novus
36
  
A number of different polls (Temo, Sifo, Skop, Demoskop, Novus and Synovate) during the 
electoral cycles 2002-2006 and 2006-2010 show that there is no decrease in uncertainty 
leading up to the election. In fact the uncertainty is somewhat higher in the May-survey 
before the election and during the November-survey the number of uncertain voters had 
dropped. If anything, this means that there is a risk for a slight underestimation of  the 
temporal proximity-effect. 
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Using aggregated data unfortunately makes it almost impossible to include any control-
variables in the tests, as well as many conventional tests of standard-errors and credibility. 
However, this drawback exists for all aggregated data, no matter the source. Two variables 
remain available using the PSU-data, the first is point in time and the second is the number of 
parties represented in the polls. Though more control-variables would be desirable these will 
help understanding any systematic shifts in insincerity in the data.  
The thesis puts the temporal proximity-effect to a hard test since the poll closest to the 
election is in May and some of the expected causal mechanisms have had very little time to 
kick-in. This combined with the risk of underestimating the effect means that the existence of 
any effects found gain extra support. 
4.2 Additional data 
There are some other polls out there that could be used to conduct this study, for example the 
SKOP-poll asks about party-preference rather than vote-intention. It should be possible to 
compare the results from that poll to some or several other polls for the corresponding time. 
There are however three problems: 1) most polls do not differentiate between vote-intention 
and party-preference, and  the two questions are not reported separately; 2) mostly the 
different polls are conducted during very different times of the month, so the SKOP-poll for 
November may be conducted during the beginning of the month and the SIFO-poll during the 
end of the month; 3) most polls has about a thousand respondents and have problems giving 
statistically significant results for the support of small parties, thus there is a ever-present risk 
that measurement errors cause substantial distortions in the results.  
These three problems makes the discrepancy measure derived from regular polls unreliable. 
However, data from the SKOP and SIFO-polls will still be used as a "worst case scenario", if 
there is a very clear trend in the data, it may show even in these less suitable polls.  
4.3 How is a insincerity-measure constructed using the data? 
Essentially, the PSU provided measures of the vote intention for each party, as well as the 
party preference for each party, during each poll. Using this data it is possible to create the 
insincerity-measure as detailed below: 
20 
 
For each PSU-survey a party-preference measure and a vote-intention measure is collected. 
Then, the party-preference result is subtracted from the vote-intention result.
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SPD (Single Party Discrepancy) = VI (vote-intention) - PP (party-preference)  
For each party we gain a "single party discrepancy"-value, it may be either positive (getting 
more vote-intention than party-preference, thus gaining insincere support) or negative (getting 
less vote-intention than party-preference, thus having sincere respondents who chose to 
support another party instead). These values are used to create the timelines in section 5.3 and 
determine which types of parties gain or lose from insincere voting during the electoral cycle. 
In order to get a useful insincerity-measure the single party discrepancy-values are then 
summarized in each poll, resulting in a over insincerity-measure (the values are treated as 
absolute values and thus added as if none of them were negative).  
Insincerity = SPD 
From this insincerity-measure it is possible to create time-lines both for the entire time-period 
and for average electoral cycles. The shifts in insincerity during these cycles is the core of the 
data-analysis. 
It may be discussed why the insincerity-measure is not divided by number of parties covered 
in the polls. There are three important reasons for this: a) the insincerity-measure captures a 
behaviour among respondents, as a group, if the measure was divided with the number of 
parties it would no longer reflect the actual amount of insincerity in the population; b) 
dividing by the number of parties would make it much more difficult to relate the insincerity-
levels discovered to the data on which parties benefits or lose on the insincere voting; c) the 
number of parties is stable for each electoral cycle, so there is no reason to expect a changing 
number of parties to interfere with the analysis.  
Since the measure is constructed similar to the one suggested in Rosemas research on vote 
sincerity and Holmberg & Oscarssons measures of insincere (tactical) voting, and since 
sincere voting is pretty much defined as voting for ones favourite party. The measure is 
expected to be very valid. The threats to its validity mostly comes in the form of overlap 
between party-preference and vote-intention in the PSU, but that problem has been 
sufficiently dealt with in section 4.1.3. and is not expected to cause any severe problems for 
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the study, except limiting the conclusions that can be drawn about absolute discrepancy 
levels. Regarding reliability, not much need to be said, the discrepancy-measure in itself will 
give the same answer whenever applied to the same data, so any reliability problem would 
have to originate in the data collection for the PSU, and as stated in section 4.1.2 the data-
collection is quite credible.
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4.4. Which conclusions does the data allow  
A limitation of the aggregated PSU-surveys is that they allow very little in terms of 
significance-testing. Of course that also limits the amount of generalization that can be done 
using this study. The margins of errors attached to the aggregated poll results sometimes 
result in an overlap between the lower bounds of party-preference and the upper bounds of 
vote-intention (or vice versa), since the study uses several electoral cycles, this should present 
no major problem, but can cause some limitations. However the data can be perceived in a 
different way: all polls tend to face this problem with overlap and tend to treat it in ways 
similar to the PSU (that is, to report the vote-intention or party-preference that is in the middle 
of their upper and lower bonds), therefore the method still says a lot about how respondents 
voting behaviour impact polls.  
Another limitation in the thesis is that the aggregated PSU-data does not have many control-
variables (except time and number of parties). As the study's aim is to discover if there is a 
temporal proximity effect on vote sincerity, this only limits deeper delving into causal 
mechanisms.   
Though previous research indicate that the mechanisms of sincere voting and temporal 
proximity to election exist in most of Europe, and though Sweden is a suitable case (se section 
3.3.) conclusions based upon only one country do have limits in how far they can be 
generalised. In future research the findings of this thesis should be replicated across a wider 
set of countries.  
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5.1. Results 
5.2.1. There is a temporal proximity-effect 
The main hypothesis was that closer to elections the discrepancy between party-preference 
and vote-intention would increase. The first result of the insincerity-measure can be illustrated 
in the graph below: 
Graph 1. Vote insincerity 1973-2010 (excluding 1981-1983) 
    
Summarized discrepancy values from vote-intention (weighted) minus party-preference (unweighted) for all 
parties, in each PSU-survey. For detailed numbers, se appendix A. Discoloured area marks the data-gap 
between 1981-1983. 
Best Linear Unbiased Estimates(BLUE)-tests (since R^2 is calculated using linear regression): Normally 
distributed residuals, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and error term causes no problems. No reason to expect 
multicollinearity with only one independent variable. Outliers causes no problematic distortions (Cook's 
distance and average leverage). Some problems with linearity (cubic model improves fit with 0.018 r^2). 
Altogether the linear model passes the BLUE-test. 
This graph shows a number of things : first of all discrepancy (which indicates insincerity) 
shifts from a lowest value of 3.3 to a highest of 16.1 percent points with an average insincerity 
of 9.4 percent points. Since we are comparing a weighted to an unweighted table, the absolute 
level of insincerity is not as important or reliable as the relative level. The relative level of 
insincerity shifts a lot between polls. In six of the nine electoral cycles insincerity starts of at a 
level lower than the previous election, in seven of the nine cycles it rises a bit two polls into 
the cycle, and in eight it drops around mid-cycle just to increase closer to the election. In 
Graph 2, 3 and 4 average measures of insincerity are used to show the general electoral cycle, 
from which more reliable assessments can be made.  
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Two additional important things show up in Graph 1: first of all: actual discrepancy in 
elections differ a lot from polls, showing that even polls close to the election have problems 
capturing voters self reported vote-sincerity (the problem may however be that reported 
sincerity after having cast a ballot does not match the actual considerations made when 
casting the ballot), the data does not support the idea that voters are more sincere in polls in 
general than they are in elections. A second important thing is that the average insincerity 
drops over time, in the graph the drop has a R^2 value of .079 (correlation between dropping 
insincerity and time), the drop is about two percent points. 
The low R^2 value of time as a variable indicates that there are other important aspects which 
explain the dropping insincerity. In the following regression analysis the only other control-
variable available (number of parties) is used.  
Table 4. Regression of vote insincerity  
 Time model N party model Combined 
model 
Year -.064 (-.121; -
.008)** 
 .047(-.068; .161)  
Number of 
parties 
 -1.027(-1.684, -
.369) ** 
-1.518 (-2.892; -
.144)** 
Intercept 137.535** 15.730*** -74.291 
R2 .079 .14 .15 
*** p<0.001, ** p< 0.05, * p<0.1. Year ranges from 1972-2010, n-parties ranges from 5-8 
Best Linear Unbiased Estimates(BLUE)-tests: Normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation 
and error term causes no problems. Outliers causes no problematic distortions (Cook's distance and average 
leverage). Some problems with linearity (cubic model improves fit with 0.018 r^2 for the "Year" variable is 
improved by 0.04 R^2 using cubic model). Multicollinearity causes problems, "number of parties" and "year" 
correlates at .877 Pearson's correlation (VIF 4.345, tolerance 0.230  are both problematic). The regression 
model does not pass the BLUE-test. However modifying the independent variables will add no further 
explanatory power. 
What the dropping level of insincerity shows is essentially that in general, respondents poll 
with a bit more sincerity now than during older electoral cycles and that the number of parties 
present in the polls is a probable part of any explanation of the dropping insincerity. 
5.2.2. Average insincerity 
In order to get average changes during election-cycles, data for each electoral cycle (in table 2 
below) has been converted into two average electoral cycles. The first cycle covers the period 
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1973-1994, when the cycles were three years long and contained six PSU-polls. The second 
average cycle covers 1994-2010, when the cycles were four years long and thus contained 
eight PSU-polls. 
Table 5. Insincerity during average electoral cycles (excluding 1979-1985) 
1973-1994 (six surveys each cycle) 1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6 5/6 6/6   
Average discrepancy (insincerity) 8.64 9.66 10.22 9.92 9.74 12.22   
1994-2010 (eight surveys each cycle) 1/8 2/8 3/8 4/8 5/8 6/8 7/8 8/8 
Average discrepancy (insincerity) 8.7 10.5 8.625 7.55 8.75 8.175 7.825 8.375 
Average discrepancies (insincerity) for three-year and four-year electoral cycles, calculations based on PSU-
data, for details se appendix A 
Graph 2. Average insincerity in the electoral cycles between 1973-1994 
   
Average insincerity (discrepancy) during the electoral cycles: 1973-1976, 1976-1979, 1985-1988,1988-1991 and 
1991-1994. Graph based on data from table 4. R^2 0.6505* (sig. .053). Best Linear Unbiased Estimates(BLUE)-
tests (since R^2 is calculated using linear regression): Normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity, 
autocorrelation and error term causes no problems. No reason to expect multicollinearity with only one 
independent variable. No outliers.  No problems with linearity. Altogether the linear model passes the BLUE-
test. 
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Graph 3. Average insincerity in the electoral cycles between 1994-2010 
 
Average insincerity (discrepancy) during the electoral cycles: 1994-1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010. 
R^2 0.267 (not significant). Best Linear Unbiased Estimates(BLUE)-tests (since R^2 is calculated using linear 
regression): Normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and the error-term causes no 
problems. No reason to expect multicollinearity with only one independent variable. No outliers. No problems 
with linearity. Altogether the linear model passes the BLUE-test 
 
In the first graph, 1973-1994, insincerity clearly rises close to the election, and drops post-
elections. In the second graph , 1994-2010, this relationship does not show, instead we get a 
rather flat line, with a bump in the second poll. This does not match what seems to happen in 
the over-all timeline, and it can be explained by looking at the cycle 1994-1998. During this 
cycle insincerity rose with about four percent-points between the election and  the second 
poll, then over the cycle it dropped from 14.7 to 3.3 percent-points. A drop large enough to 
drown out the changes in the rest of the electoral cycles averaged.  This electoral cycle was 
also somewhat special, a party that had previously dropped out (The Greens - Miljöpartiet) re-
entered parliament while another party (New Democracy - Ny demokrati) dropped out. It 
could explain the very high insincerity-levels in the polls soon after the 1994 election. 
Unfortunately it does not explain why insincerity dropped to the lowest level recorded in the 
end of the 1994-1998 cycle. What is clear is that the cycle 1994-1998 was abnormal. 
  
26 
 
Graph 4 . Average insincerity in the electoral cycles between 1998-2010 
 
Average insincerity (discrepancy) during the electoral cycles: 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010. Excluding 
1994-1998. R^2 0.5806** Best Linear Unbiased Estimates(BLUE)-tests (since R^2 is calculated using linear 
regression): Acceptably normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity , autocorrelation causes no problems, 
and the  error-term is sufficient. No reason to expect multicollinearity with only one independent variable. No 
outliers. No problems with linearity. The linear model passes the BLUE-test 
 
When the period 1994-1998 is excluded, the data supports the same interpretation as the 
earlier cycles: leading up to the election insincerity increases, but after the election insincerity 
drops and voters are more sincere. For the cycles between 1973-1994 the average increase of 
insincerity during the cycle was about 3.6 percent points (from 8.64% to 12.22%). During 
1998-2010 insincerity rose with about 2.3 percent points over the average electoral cycle 
(from 7.8% to 10.1%). Interestingly both the 1973-1994 average cycle and the 1998-2010 
average cycle gets very high and significant R^2-values in regression-analysis focusing on the 
relationship between time until election and level of insincerity, (0.6505* and  0.5806**, not 
to be mistaken for slope-coefficients). It implies strong correlations between point of time in 
the electoral cycle and level of insincerity. As the tables indicate a temporal proximity-effect 
is indeed there, and it has a substantial impact on the poll results.   
This temporal proximity-effect is not exactly the same as expected in the first hypothesis. The 
first hypothesis is: a) sincerity is systematically smaller around elections than around mid-
cycle periods, and predicts less sincerity both before and after the election. The temporal 
proximity-effect hypothesised would  look something like a series of slow, gentle waves, with 
peaks during the elections. The temporal proximity-effect discovered looks more like a series 
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of slopes, leading up to steep drops: a "temporal proximity until next election"-effect as 
modelled in the graph below: 
Graph 5. Models of temporal proximity-effects 
 
5.2.3. Additional data 
When making an electoral cycle average for the SKOP and SIFO-data , things become a lot 
less clear, first of all the cycle display each month, unfortunately for some months there are 
no polls. Even so, the SIFO/SKOP-data does not display any clear electoral cycle trend at all. 
Graph 6. Average insincerity in the cycles between and 2002-2010, using SKOP and 
SIFO-data
 
SIFO and SKOP-data collected and published by Novus
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5.3 Who benefits? 
The second hypothesis was that small parties and opposition parties were going to benefit the 
most in polls. What is shown here is how much different types of parties benefit or lose from 
insincere voting. Combined with the temporal proximity-effect the thesis expect that small 
parties and opposition-parties will benefit more further from elections. In the following graphs 
parties benefits or losses from the insincere portion of the votes is broken down into average 
electoral cycles. 
 
Graph 7. winning or losing from insincere voting 1973-1994 
 
Detailed data in appendix B and C. Parties with more than 20% electoral support in the last election are 
classified as "large parties". Support parties are not given separate category.  
 
Graph 8. winning or losing from insincere voting 1994-2010 
 
Detailed data in appendix B and C. Parties with more than 20% electoral support in the last election are 
classified as "large parties". Support parties are not given separate category. 
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It is a bit problematic to use Sweden to investigate this aspect of polls, since the Social 
democrats have been a hugely dominating party for a long time, which is reflected in how 
they have been losing support due to insincere voting in every poll until the 21:th century (but 
their losses have been smaller when in opposition). As a result a lot of the losses of 
government and large parties are losses of the Social democrats, and mandates some 
carefulness when making any kind of generalisation.  
In general graph 7 and 8 show that opposition-parties, small parties and especially small 
opposition-parties tend to benefit from insincere voting in polls. However moving closer to 
the election does not seem to make any substantial difference. This lack of temporal 
proximity-effect means that the results do not support the second hypothesis. Even though 
these parties seem to benefit a bit from insincerity, they do not benefit or lose more when 
insincerity increases.   
6.1. Discussion 
6.2. Why is there no temporal proximity-effect post-election? 
The first hypothesis gained mixed support, it predicted rising insincerity (less sincerity) in 
polls closer to the election. For the time leading up to the election, this turned out to be the 
case. However this temporal proximity-effect disappeared after the election, making the 
model incorrect. This corresponds with other findings on Swedish polls: the months closest 
after an election, voters are more likely to change which party they support than during any 
other period except the months just before the election, meaning that at least some kind of 
important change (maybe a "winner of election-effect") in respondent behaviour happens 
during these first months of a new electoral cycle.
40
 
A possible explanation for this can be derived from the field of psychology and the theory of 
cognitive dissonance: people tend to change their attitudes and opinions in order to fit their 
behaviour - it is possible that voting for a party increases the chances of making the party a 
favourite.
41
 Another possible explanation is that many of the rational concerns that makes 
people vote insincerely disappear the moment the election is over. If the salience of the 
upcoming election raises insincere concerns in the polls (as predicted in the first hypothesis), 
then getting done with the election may also result in getting done with the insincere 
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concerns. It would imply that voters are more rational and aware in their temporal proximity-
behaviour than Franklin & Weber's findings indicate.  
What this thesis find can be called a "temporal proximity until next election"-effect. Whether 
it can be best explained using cognitive dissonance, rational concerns or some other 
explanation remains for future research to determine and requires deeper delving into the 
actual reasoning of respondents.  
6.3. Implications for Franklin & Weber's theory 
Despite being different from Franklin and Weber's research, this study did share the feature of 
looking on how temporal proximity to election structure respondents voting behaviour. 
Franklin & Weber looked at how voting in EP-elections was structured, while this study 
focuses on the responses in polls. Despite sharing several second-order-election features, polls 
do differ from EP-elections in a very significant way: polls are still about national politics, 
while EP-elections may also be about European union-politics. This difference may be 
important to explain why they found a temporal proximity-effect, while this study discovered 
a "temporal proximity until next election"-effect. In Franklin & Weber's case a whole lot of 
national concerns sort of crowd out EP-concerns and even after the national election, some 
national concerns may remain. In this thesis it is the insincere national concerns that crowd 
out other national concerns, and after the election they may all become irrelevant. 
In general this thesis confirms Franklin & Weber's findings, but there is a small conceptual 
difference. Franklin & Weber prefer to not explain their results as people "voting with their 
hearts". An important reasons is that "voting with ones heart" can imply voting on a whim or 
without thinking, which they do not find in their results. However this thesis cannot establish 
how much thinking has gone into the responses to opinion polls. Therefore the simplest 
explanation for the temporal proximity-effect on vote sincerity found in this thesis may be 
that respondents "poll with their hearts". It is important to understand that Franklin & Weber's 
explanation does not reject sincere voting, just ill-considered voting. In this thesis sincere 
voting is found to be part of the rational concerns which are overridden by the concerns of the 
national election. Unfortunately the thesis is unable to determine how rational respondents 
sincerity is.  
Finally, this study highlights an area that requires future research: If proximity to elections do 
structure responses in polls and elections with second-order-features, then how does this 
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structuring work? Is it simply a matter of salience and temporal proximity (as indicated by 
Franklin & Weber) or is the explanation more messy (as indicated in this thesis)? 
6.4. Implications for polls 
Are there special features of polls which make them different from national elections? 
According to this thesis there are. Much like second-order election polls display a temporal 
proximity-effect. Respondents are more likely to vote sincerely (vote for their favourite 
parties) in polls further from the next election. In the PSU-polls in Sweden (where the 
absolute numbers are a bit unreliable) the insincerity increased with 3.6 (1973-1994) and 2.3 
(1998-2010) percent points from the beginning to the end of the average cycles. This at least 
indicate that the results in polls far from the election will be less reliable when it comes to 
predicting election results, because the election encourages different concerns among 
respondents. 
Another problem in polls was discovered almost incidentally: there is a large difference 
between vote-intention and party-preference (the insincerity measure). On average in the PSU 
this difference was 9.4 percent points. Despite this, several polls still use the party-preference-
question as a proxy to fill out where people are unable to answer the vote-intention question. 
Party-preference and vote-intention is not the same thing, and this difference naturally has to 
show up in the results. Fortunately the results in this thesis show that shifting levels of 
sincerity does not benefit specific party-types, so even if polls do not predict election results 
as well further from the next election, there is no evidence that they predict wrong in 
systematic favour of any specific parties. 
7. Conclusions  
This thesis has provided mixed support for the hypothesis that "Sincerity is systematically 
smaller close to elections than around mid-cycle periods". Discrepancy between party-
preference and voting-intention (and thus insincere voting) increases in the period leading up 
to the election, but then drops greatly. Thus a simple temporal proximity-effect is unfit to 
explain the data, while a "temporal proximity until next election"-effect fits better. A theory 
incorporating rational choice or one using cognitive dissonance may explain this effect.  
Many of the rational concerns that makes people vote insincerely disappear the moment the 
election is over. If the salience of the upcoming election raises insincere concerns in the polls, 
then getting done with the election may also result in getting done with the insincere 
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concerns. The theory of cognitive dissonance, on the other hand, states that people tend to 
change their attitudes and opinions in order to fit their behaviour. It is possible that voting for 
a party increases the chances of making the party a favourite. 
Finally: who benefits? According to the second hypothesis: The main beneficiaries in polls 
with more vote sincerity will be both: a) small parties; b) Opposition parties. However there 
was no clear tendency for a specific party-type to benefit or lose when vote sincerity 
decreased closer to the election. The second hypothesis was thus rejected. For the people 
making polls this is good news: if there are problems with the measurement in polls, they are 
at least not systematic.  
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9. Appendix  
Appendix A 
Discrepancy-levels for each electoral cycle (excluding cycles between 1979-1985). Based on 
appendix B and C. 
1973-1994 1973-1976 1976-1979 1985-1988 1988-1991 1991-1994 Average 
1/6 7.7 8 10.5 10.3 6.7 8.64 
2/6 9.6 7.9 10.6 13.3 6.9 9.66 
3/6 11.4 5 12.8 13.1 8.8 10.22 
4/6 11.3 8.5 12.4 10 7.4 9.92 
5/6 12.7 9.5 10.4 9.3 6.8 9.74 
6/6 16.1 10.7 14.1 10.9 9.3 12.22 
1994-2010 1994-1998 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010  Average 
1/8 11.4 6.5 9.2 7.7  8.7 
2/8 14.7 8.5 11.8 7  10.5 
3/8 9.9 6.7 9.6 8.3  8.625 
4/8 6.3 8 9.4 6.5  7.55 
5/8 8.9 9.2 10.8 6.1  8.75 
6/8 5.5 10.3 10.1 6.8  8.175 
7/8 3.7 8.4 10.7 8.5  7.825 
8/8 3.3 11.2 10.4 8.6  8.375 
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Appendix B: Vote-intention for each party 1972-2012 
Vote-
intention 1972M11 1973M02 1973M05 1973M11 1974M05 1974M11 1975M05 1975M11 
M 10.9 11.4 12.8 14 14.1 14.3 15.1 15.3 
C 26.7 26.3 25.6 26.6 25.9 25.1 24.7 23.9 
FP 13.4 13 12.5 8.7 8.2 8.5 7.6 8.9 
KD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
NYD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
MP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
S 40.6 41.3 41.3 43.9 44.7 44.6 45.1 44.3 
V 5.7 5.2 5.2 4.8 5 5.1 5.2 5 
SD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
others 2.6 2.6 2.6 2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6 
  
1976M02 1976M05 1976M11 1977M05 1977M11 1978M05 1978M11 1979M02 1979M05 
15.3 16.9 15 14.5 14.5 15.5 15.6 15.5 16 
23.5 22.8 23.5 22.8 21.8 20.3 20.6 19.9 21.1 
10.1 10.8 11 9.3 9.6 10.1 12.1 13.7 13.6 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
44 42.3 43.8 47.6 48.1 47.7 45.2 44.2 42 
4.8 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.9 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2.3 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2 2.4 
  
1979M11 1980M05 1980M11 1981M05 1984M05 1984M11 1985M05 1985M11 1986M05 
21 21 20.8 22.6 25.9 27.8 27.6 20.4 18.8 
18 16.5 15.6 12.8 14.7 14.4 12.6 9.7 10.3 
10 8.7 7.2 6.4 6.2 6.6 6.5 17.9 16.7 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
43.8 46.5 48.9 50.6 44.4 41.7 43.7 43.6 46.4 
5.7 5.6 5.4 5.4 4.5 4.8 5 5.1 4.3 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1.5 1.8 2.1 2.2 4.2 4.7 4.6 3.3 3.5 
 
1986M11 1987M05 1987M11 1988M02 1988M05 1988M11 1989M05 1989M11 1990M05 
20.4 18.8 19.9 18.9 20.6 17.8 20.4 24.2 26.2 
10.4 9.9 9.4 9.8 9.3 11.8 12.2 11 11.6 
16 16 16 16.6 15.2 11.9 12.1 12.4 12.5 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
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.. .. .. .. .. 5.7 6.2 5.7 4.7 
44.9 42.8 42 43.2 42.6 43.8 39.3 36.2 32.8 
4.5 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.7 5.5 6.2 7 7.8 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
3.8 8.4 8.4 7.1 7.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.4 
  
1990M11 1991M05 1991M11 1992M05 1992M11 1993M05 1993M11 1994M05 1994M11 
29.1 23.4 22.5 20 21.4 19.6 19.6 21.8 22.9 
10.7 9.8 8.1 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.6 7.9 7.6 
11.9 10 8.8 6.7 6.8 7.2 6.8 6.7 6.6 
.. 7.1 6.8 5 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.4 4.2 
.. 8.7 6.8 9.6 8.3 5.8 5.3 2.3 .. 
4 2.6 3.1 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.6 6.7 
31.2 32.1 39.1 46 45.8 49.8 50.8 50.1 44.9 
6.4 5.4 4.1 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.9 6.7 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
6.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 
  
1995M05 1995M11 1996M05 1996M11 1997M05 1997M11 1998M05 1998M11 1999M05 
25.1 25.7 25.7 25.8 30.4 29.2 27.2 24.6 26.4 
8.3 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.1 5.9 5 4.7 
7.1 5.2 5.9 6.5 5.9 6.5 6.8 4.9 4.2 
4 3.8 3.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 11.1 11.9 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
6 12.1 8.7 7.4 6.4 4.9 5.7 4.3 4.1 
36 34.2 36.9 34.7 34.9 39.2 40.1 36.3 34.1 
12.9 11.7 11.6 12 10.4 8.4 8.5 12 13.2 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
0.7 0.6 0.7 2.1 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.4 
  
1999M11 2000M05 2000M11 2001M05 2001M11 2002M05 2002M11 2003M05 2003M11 
25.2 24.6 23.9 23.6 23.8 21.9 15.3 16.8 20 
4.5 4.6 4.6 7.2 5.8 5.4 5.8 6.5 6.6 
5.3 5.2 4.6 4.9 4.9 5.1 13.7 14.5 13.6 
11.1 10.9 12.5 10.1 9.6 9.2 8.5 8.2 7 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
4.5 4.6 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.9 4.6 4.5 
36.1 35.4 35.3 36.7 39.9 43.1 41.3 38.3 36.9 
12.2 13.3 14 12.6 11.4 10.4 9.1 9.1 9.3 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.7 2.5 2.1 2.2 
  
2004M05 2004M11 2005M05 2005M11 2006M05 2006M11 2007M05 2007M11 2008M05 
21.6 23.4 27.7 25.9 25.9 24.9 23.9 22.6 22.4 
6.6 6.7 6.5 5.9 6.2 7.1 6.5 6.2 6.2 
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11.7 12 11.7 11.1 10.9 6.8 5.9 6.5 6.8 
6.2 5.5 4.4 4.8 5.8 5.7 4.4 4.6 4.6 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
4.6 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.7 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.9 
37.7 37.9 34.7 37.1 37.5 40.4 45 45.9 44.7 
9.5 7.6 7 5.7 5.8 5.4 5 5.1 5.1 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2.2 2.2 3.5 5.5 3.3 4.2 4 3.9 4.2 
  
2008M11 2009M05 2009M11 2010M05 2010M11 2011M05 2011M11 2012M05 2012M11 
24.8 29.9 26.2 29.2 32.4 31.1 33.4 28.6 28.1 
5.9 5.5 5 4.6 5.8 4.5 5.5 4.7 4.4 
6 5.5 6.5 5.8 6.8 6 5.6 5.5 5.5 
4.5 4.3 4.8 4.5 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
6.1 6 8.4 10.7 8.8 8.9 11.7 8.1 8.6 
42.3 36.6 36.5 33.8 29 34 27.7 37.3 34.8 
5.7 5.7 5.1 5.6 4.7 4.5 5.2 5.9 5.8 
.. .. .. .. 6.7 5.7 5.7 5.4 7.9 
4.7 6.4 7.5 5.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.8 1.2 
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Appendix C: Party-preference 1972-2010 
Party-
preference 1972M11 1973M02 1973M05 1973M11 1974M05 1974M11 1975M05 1975M11 
M 10.6 10.8 12.8 13 13.2 13.3 13.6 13.9 
C 25.4 27.3 26.6 26.3 24.8 23.6 23.7 22 
FP 10.9 10.3 9.3 7.7 6.7 7 6.2 8.2 
KD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
NYD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
MP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
S 47.2 45.4 45.8 47.8 49.4 50.3 50.7 50.7 
V 3.9 4 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.5 
SD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
others 2 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.1 2 1.8 
 
1976M02 1976M05 1976M11 1977M05 1977M11 1978M05 1978M11 1979M02 1979M05 
13.5 15.3 13.2 14.3 13.7 14.1 14.3 14.2 15.2 
20.9 18.8 23 21 21.8 19.5 20 18.7 19.3 
9.4 10.6 11 8.5 9.1 9.6 10.8 13 13.1 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
51.2 50.4 47.8 51.5 50.6 52 50 49.2 47.3 
3.2 3.2 3.1 3 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.4 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1.6 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
 
1979M11 1980M05 1980M11 1981M05 1984M05 1984M11 1985M05 1985M11 1986M05 
19 20.3 19.6 21.8 24.1 26.1 25.9 18.9 16.6 
17.1 16.4 15.1 13 13.7 13.2 11.8 9.5 9.8 
10.3 7.3 6.1 5 6.3 6.4 6.4 15.8 15.1 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.8 1.4 
47.4 49.7 52.4 53.7 48.8 46.7 48.3 47.9 51.7 
4.6 5.1 5.2 5.1 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.5 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1.6 1.3 1.6 1.4 3.8 4.1 3.9 2.2 1.9 
 
1986M11 1987M05 1987M11 1988M02 1988M05 1988M11 1989M05 1989M11 1990M05 
17 16.4 18.3 17.4 18.1 16.4 18.4 22.1 25.7 
9.7 9.5 8.7 9 9 10.9 11.6 10.4 10.9 
14.9 14.5 14.6 14.5 12.8 11.1 10.7 11.7 11.1 
.. .. .. .. 1.1 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.9 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
2 5.8 6.6 5.8 5.9 5.7 6 5.3 4.8 
51.3 49 47.2 48.7 49.1 48.9 46 42.7 37.7 
3.5 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.6 4.3 4.8 5.3 6.3 
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.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 
 
1990M11 1991M05 1991M11 1992M05 1992M11 1993M05 1993M11 1994M05 1994M11 
28.4 23.8 24.5 21.5 23.8 21.4 20.2 20.7 22.3 
10.1 8.5 8.6 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.7 7.6 7.7 
10.7 8.7 9 7 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.7 6.6 
5.3 7.3 6.6 4.7 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.6 
.. 6.9 4.7 7.2 6.1 4.1 3.7 1.6 .. 
3.7 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.3 4.4 
35.7 37 39.8 47.7 47.8 51.5 53.5 54.7 50.3 
5.3 4.8 4.1 3.1 3 3.1 3.5 3.3 5.5 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.7 
 
1995M05 1995M11 1996M05 1996M11 1997M05 1997M11 1998M05 1998M11 1999M05 
23.5 24.5 25.4 25.8 31.6 29.3 28.4 24.9 26.3 
8.1 6.8 6.6 6.6 6 5.6 5.6 5.1 4.7 
6.9 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.5 6.4 6.5 5.8 5.1 
2.5 2.7 2.7 3.6 3.4 3.8 4.3 8.6 9.5 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
4.9 10.6 8.7 8.3 6.5 5.2 5.6 4.9 4.9 
43.1 38.9 40.1 38.2 36.3 40.6 40.6 38.9 36.6 
10 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.1 8.5 8.3 10.6 12.2 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
0.8 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.6 
 
1999M11 2000M05 2000M11 2001M05 2001M11 2002M05 2002M11 2003M05 2003M11 
25.6 24.9 23.9 22.2 22.6 20.6 15.8 17.3 19.6 
4.9 5.3 4.4 6.8 5.9 5.7 6 5.9 6.3 
5.7 5.6 4.7 5.2 5 5.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 
9.2 8.3 9.3 7.6 7.6 6.3 6.7 6.4 5.8 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
4.9 5.1 4.4 4 3.3 3.2 4.2 4.5 4.9 
37.8 37.5 39 40.4 43.9 48.4 44.7 43.7 41.3 
11.4 12.5 13.5 13.1 11.1 9.7 9.3 9.1 8.9 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 1 1.2 0.9 0.9 
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2004M05 2004M11 2005M05 2005M11 2006M05 2006M11 2007M05 2007M11 2008M05 
21.9 23.2 28.8 27.9 27.8 27.2 25.8 25.3 24.1 
5.5 6.3 6.1 6.3 6 7.4 6 5.6 5.6 
10.6 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.9 7.3 6.5 6.9 7 
5.2 4.4 4 3.6 4 5 3.9 3.4 3.5 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
4.5 5.5 4.6 4.5 4.9 5.9 6.1 5.7 6.4 
42 41.9 37.7 39.3 40.4 38.6 44 45.2 45.3 
9.3 8.1 7.8 6 6 5.7 5.3 5.7 5.4 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
0.9 0.9 1.8 3.5 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.7 
 
2008M11 2009M05 2009M11 2010M05 2010M11 
27.2 31.2 29.8 32.1 34.9 
5.4 4.9 4.5 3.9 4.8 
6.2 6 7.1 6.8 7 
3.4 3.4 3.9 3.6 3.7 
.. .. .. .. .. 
6.1 6.4 8.2 10.6 9.9 
42.5 37.8 36.4 32.6 30.5 
5.9 5.7 4.9 6.1 5.1 
.. .. .. 2.9 3.1 
3.2 4.5 5.1 1.5 0.9 
 
  
42 
 
Appendix D: Discrepancy from SOM-data (http://www.som.gu.se/) 
1985 
Vote-
intention 
Party-
preference 
 
1988 
Vote-
intention 
Party-
preference Discrepancy 
V 4.7 
  
V 5.5 4.6 0.9 
S 47.9 
  
S 44.3 43.4 0.9 
C 9.4 
  
C 11.3 10.3 1 
FP 14.1 
  
FP 13 12.3 0.7 
M 20.2 
  
M 16 15.7 0.3 
KD 1.3 
  
KD 2.7 3.4 -0.7 
MP 2.2 
  
MP 6.9 8.2 -1.3 
Others 0.2 
  
Others 0.2 2.1 -1.9 
    
Total   4.4 
1991 
Vote-
intention 
Party-
preference Discrepancy 1994 
Vote-
intention 
Party-
preference Discrepancy 
V 
5.1 4.6 0.5 V 6 6.9 -0.9 
S 
37.3 31.9 5.4 S 44.8 43 1.8 
C 
9 7.3 1.7 C 7.8 7.3 0.5 
FP 
9.3 9.1 0.2 FP 8.2 8.2 0 
M 
20.5 21.7 -1.2 M 23.2 21.8 1.4 
KD 
7.5 8.4 -0.9 KD 4.1 3.4 0.7 
MP 
3.8 3.6 0.2 MP 4.4 5.4 -1 
NYD 
6.5 7.3 -0.8 NYD 0.8 1.4 -0.6 
Others 
0.9 6.2 -5.3 Others 0.7 2.6 -1.9 
Total 
  
16.2 Total   8.8 
 
1998 
Vote-
intention 
Party-
preference Discrepancy 2002 
Vote-
intention 
Party-
preference Discrepancy 
V 
12.1 12.7 -0.6 V 7.9 8.6 -0.7 
S 
37.4 35.8 1.6 S 42 41.5 0.5 
C 
5.1 4.5 0.6 C 6.3 6.5 -0.2 
FP 
5.1 5.1 0 FP 15.8 16.6 -0.8 
M 
22.2 22.1 0.1 M 13.4 11.6 1.8 
KD 
11.5 11.6 -0.1 KD 7.8 7.8 0 
MP 
4.8 5.8 -1 MP 4.6 4.2 0.4 
Others 
1.8 2.4 -0.6 Others 2.1 3.1 -1 
Total 
  
4.6 SD  0.8 5.4 
 
 
 
2006 
Vote-
intention 
Party-
preference Discrepancy 
 Total 
V 
5.8 5.9 -0.1 2010 
Vote-
intention 
Party-
preference Discrepancy 
S 
34.1 32.8 1.3 V 5.4 4.4 1 
C 
7.5 7.7 -0.2 S 28.9 26.8 2.1 
FP 
7.8 7.2 0.6 C 6.6 4.9 1.7 
M 
28.2 27.1 1.1 FP 8 7.9 0.1 
43 
 
 
 
 
KD 
6.6 6.8 -0.2 M 31.5 33.3 -1.8 
MP 
5.6 7.8 -2.2 KD 6.3 4.1 2.2 
Others 
4.5 4.8 -0.3 MP 8.2 11.1 -2.9 
SD 
  2.2 
 
SD 
3.9 4.2 -0.3 
FI 
  0.6 
 
FI 
0.3 0.7 -0.4 
PP 
 
0.5 
 
PP 
0.5 1 -0.5 
Total  
 
  6 Others 0.3 1.6 -1.3 
    Total   14.3 
